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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
After a limited partnership failed, four investors in the 
partnership brought suit against the partnership, the 
corporate general partner, officers of the general partner, 
employees of the partnership, and the law firm that 
represented the partnership. The investors asserted causes 
of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), and companion Rule 10b-5, 17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Alan N. Bloch of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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C.F.R. S 240.10b-5, section 1962 of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 
S 1962, and common law fraud. The investors later 
attempted to amend their complaint to assert causes of 
action for failure to disclose material information under the 
Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
110A, S 101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Securities Act of 
1972, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, S 1-101 et seq., and for fraud 
in violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, S 1 et seq., and the Pennsylvania 
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 73, S 201-1 et seq. 
 
The law firm and the other defendants opposed the 
motion to amend, and they filed motions for summary 
judgment. The district court denied the investors' motion to 
amend as to the law firm, and it granted the firm's motion 
for summary judgment in its entirety. Subsequently, the 
remaining defendants settled with the investors. 
 
The investors appealed from the district court'sfinal 
order granting the law firm's motion for summary judgment 
and denying the investors' motion for leave to amend. We 
agree with the district court that the federal securities 
claim of one of the investors is barred by the statute of 
limitations. As to the remaining investors, however, we 
disagree with the district court's disposition of the federal 
securities claim and conclude that the investors have 
proffered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact as to (1) whether the law firm made a 
statement containing a material omission upon which the 
investors relied, and (2) whether the law firm acted with 
scienter. In so concluding, we hold that a lawyer who can 
fairly be characterized as an author or a co-author of a 
client's fraudulent document may be held primarily liable to 
a third-party investor under the federal securities laws for 
the material misstatements or omissions contained in the 
document, even when the lawyer did not sign or endorse 
the document and the investor is therefore unaware of the 
lawyer's role in the fraud.1 We will reverse the judgment of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We later set forth the following specific requirements to hold such a 
lawyer liable: (1) the lawyer knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that 
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the district court insofar as it granted the law firm's motion 
for summary judgment on the federal securities claim as to 
three of the four investors. Similarly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the district court on the investors' common law 
fraud claim, which claim was timely as to all four investors. 
 
As to the investors' RICO claims, we conclude that the 
law firm did not participate in the operation or management 
of the purported enterprise and cannot, therefore, be liable 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c). Consequently, the law firm 
cannot be liable, under 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d), for conspiracy 
to violate section 1962(c). We hold that there is no private 
cause of action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation. We 
will, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court 
insofar as it granted the law firm's motion for summary 
judgment on the investors' RICO claims, although we do so 
for reasons different from those offered by the district court. 
 
Finally, we will affirm the district court's order denying 
the investors' motion for leave to further amend their 
complaint, as the proposed amendments would not survive 
a renewed motion to dismiss. The investors may not pursue 
a claim against the law firm under the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law because 
securities are not "goods" under that law. The investors 
may not pursue a claim against the law firm under the 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act because the 
investors did not have a "business relationship" with the 
firm. The investors may not pursue a claim against the law 
firm under either the Pennsylvania Securities Act or the 
Massachusetts Securities Act because the firm was not a 
statutory "agent" of the limited partnership. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the statement will be relied upon by investors, (2) the lawyer is aware 
(or 
is reckless in not being aware) of the material misstatement or omission, 
(3) the lawyer played such a substantial role in the creation of the 
statement that the lawyer could fairly be said to be the "author" or "co- 
author" of the statement, and (4) the other requirements of primary 
liability are satisfied. 
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I.2 
 
William Coleman has a long record of securities fraud, 
regulatory sanction, and customer claims of fraudulent 
conduct dating back to 1981. He was censured by the 
Chicago Board of Options in 1987 for unauthorized trading. 
He entered into a consent order with the states of Vermont 
and Minnesota which barred him from certain broker- 
dealer positions. He was prohibited from soliciting clients 
pursuant to agreements with the National Association of 
Securities Dealers ("NASD"). Numerous complaints were 
brought against Coleman by investors, including claims of 
fraud, unauthorized option trading, and churning; many of 
these claims were settled at or near the full amount of the 
claim. 
 
Since 1990, Coleman had been the stock broker and 
financial adviser for Pennsylvania resident Elyse Klein. 
Richard and Doris Kastner, Elyse's parents and residents of 
Pennsylvania, retained Coleman as their broker in 1990 or 
1991. Warren Kastner, Richard's brother and a resident of 
Massachusetts, also retained Coleman as his broker in 
1990 or 1991.3 These investors were not aware of 
Coleman's record. 
 
In 1992, Coleman and Thomas Tarantino joined to 
purchase the securities brokerage business of Edward C. 
Rorer & Co. Tarantino recommended retaining Drinker 
Biddle & Reath ("Drinker"), a Philadelphia law firm, to 
provide legal advice and to assist in the formation of the 
new business entity. Robert Strouse, a partner at Drinker, 
assumed primary responsibility for the matter. Strouse 
asked Paula Calhoun, a junior associate at Drinker, to 
assist him. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because we are reviewing the grant of the law firm's motion for 
summary judgment, we must view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the investors. Thus, the investors' evidence is to be believed, and all 
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in their favor. Kline v. First W. 
Gov't 
Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
3. We will refer to Elyse Klein, Richard Kastner, Doris Kastner, and 
Warren Kastner individually by first name or collectively as "the 
investors." 
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In September 1992, Strouse met with Coleman and 
Tarantino to discuss the transaction. Coleman and 
Tarantino explained the concept of the new business they 
were forming and the terms of the agreement they wanted 
Drinker to prepare. They explained that Mercer Securities, 
Ltd. ("Mercer LP") was to purchase Rorer's business. Mercer 
LP was to be organized as a limited partnership with a 
corporate general partner, Mercer Securities, Inc. ("Mercer, 
Inc."). 
 
Coleman and Tarantino explained that Mercer, Inc. was 
already in existence, and that Coleman owned 60% of its 
stock, Tarantino owned 30%, and William Boyd owned 
10%. Boyd became president of Mercer, Inc. and would be 
the "financial principal" of Mercer LP. Strouse also learned 
that broker Steven Schappell was to join Mercer LP and 
would play an important role in the firm's financial success. 
 
Near the end of the September meeting, Coleman and 
Tarantino set up a conference call with Richard and 
Warren, whom Strouse was told were going to be investors 
in Mercer LP, and discussed with them the terms of the 
investment. After the meeting, Strouse learned that Elyse 
was also going to invest in Mercer LP based on similar 
representations made by Coleman. 
 
After the meeting, Strouse learned from Tarantino that 
Mercer LP, without waiting for Drinker to draft the 
partnership and subscription agreement or the necessary 
disclosure documents, had begun operations. Strouse 
learned that Coleman had already solicited and received 
$50,000 from Elyse, $100,000 from Richard and Doris, and 
$100,000 from Warren. Coleman had told the investors that 
they would face little risk and that they would receive a 
25% annual return. When Strouse learned that Mercer LP 
had received these investments without providing written 
disclosures, he advised that the partnership agreement be 
completed, that a disclosure letter be provided to the 
investors, and that the investors be given an opportunity to 
reaffirm or rescind their investments. 
 
Strouse did not learn that Coleman had a history of 
securities violations and customer complaints until after 
the September meeting. According to the investors, in 
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November or December 1992, Tarantino told Strouse that 
Coleman had concealed the full extent of his compliance 
history from Tarantino (and presumably from the investors 
as well). Strouse also learned that Boyd had a history of 
unemployment and was censured for permitting the 
subordinated debt of a prior law firm which failed to exceed 
the appropriate level in 1989. 
 
By January 1993, the partnership agreement was still 
not completed, the investors had not received any 
disclosures, and the investors were not given an 
opportunity to reaffirm or rescind their investments. Mercer 
LP repaid the investors one quarter of their investment, 
purportedly as interest. That month, Strouse reiterated the 
need to complete the partnership and disclosure 
documents. 
 
In February 1993, Drinker finally completed the 
partnership agreement and a subscription agreement, and 
put together a disclosure package which included a 
disclosure letter, U-4 Forms for Coleman and Boyd 
reflecting their compliance history, and other documents 
describing the various state supervisory orders and 
judgments entered against Coleman. The disclosure letter 
explained, inter alia, Coleman's compliance history and the 
fact that the NASD had substantially restricted Coleman's 
conduct as a broker. On February 5, 1993, Strouse and 
Calhoun gave Coleman and Tarantino the "February 
Disclosure Package" and instructed them that they needed 
to deliver it to the investors and obtain necessary 
signatures. 
 
In May 1993, Boyd called a meeting of Mercer, Inc.'s 
directors. Strouse participated by telephone. Boyd stated 
that the February Disclosure Package had not been 
delivered to the investors. Strouse advised that the package 
should be delivered and that all necessary signatures 
should be obtained. Coleman and Tarantino balked at 
Strouse's suggestion. The February Disclosure Package was 
never delivered to the investors. The evidence of record does 
not contain any suggestion that Strouse ever had any 
reason to believe otherwise. 
 
From February 1993 through June 1993, numerous 
orders and restrictions were entered against Coleman, 
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including Virginia and West Virginia orders imposing 
supervisory restrictions on Coleman, a California order 
barring Coleman from holding any position as a broker- 
dealer or investment advisor for four years, a Minnesota 
order barring Coleman from registration as a representative 
for five years, and an Oregon order barring Coleman from 
registration as an agent. During the same time period, 
Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, California, Minnesota, 
and Oregon imposed supervisory restrictions on Mercer LP. 
Strouse learned of these orders no later than August 1993. 
 
In addition, Florida refused to register Mercer LP because 
of Coleman's involvement. By August 1993, Strouse knew 
that, although Mercer LP was not registered in Florida, 
Mercer LP had transacted $1.8 million in that state. Also by 
August 1993, Strouse was aware that Schappell had once 
pled guilty to possession of cocaine. 
 
On July 7, 1993, following a dispute with Coleman, 
Tarantino was ousted as director and officer of Mercer, Inc. 
 
In August 1993, Boyd asked Drinker to prepare a form 
letter that Mercer LP could use to repurchase a limited 
partnership interest. Calhoun drafted the letter and sent it 
to Boyd, who adapted the letter and used it to repurchase 
the 1992 investments of Richard, Doris and Warren. 
 
In August 1993, Coleman persuaded Elyse, who may 
have been in Massachusetts at the time, to invest an 
additional $200,000 in Mercer LP on different terms. 
Coleman assured Elyse that there would be no risk. At this 
time, Coleman owned 60% of the shares of Mercer, Inc. and 
a substantial portion of the limited partnership units of 
Mercer LP. 
 
Mercer LP came to understand that it would not be 
permitted to register to do business as a broker-dealer in 
certain states while Coleman was a part owner. In August 
1993, Coleman sold his interest in Mercer LP to his mother. 
 
In September 1993, Coleman solicited Richard and Doris 
to reinvest their $100,000 on different terms. Coleman 
owned 60% of the shares of Mercer, Inc. at this time. 
 
Strouse advised Mercer LP that a new partnership 
agreement, subscription agreement and disclosure letter 
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should be prepared to reflect recent changes. In September 
1993, Drinker prepared an amended limited partnership 
agreement reflecting the new 1993 investments. Drinker 
gave the amended agreement to Coleman, who arranged to 
have it signed by Elyse, Richard and Doris. 
 
In October 1993, Coleman sold his 60% interest in 
Mercer, Inc. to Mercer LP brokers Gregory Jamgochian and 
Lawrence Stevens. Coleman divested his interest in Mercer, 
Inc. because state securities regulators refused to give 
Mercer LP permission to operate in Florida so long as 
Coleman had an interest in the company. 
 
In October or November 1993, Drinker prepared a 
disclosure package for distribution to Elyse, Richard and 
Doris. The so-called "November Disclosure Package" did not 
contain any information about Coleman's checkered 
compliance history and current restrictions. The package 
did not contain any information about disciplinary actions 
taken against Boyd. The package did not contain any 
information about the significant restrictions placed on 
Mercer LP or the partnership's precarious financial 
position. The package did not contain any information 
about Schappell's drug conviction. 
 
Boyd forwarded the November Disclosure Package to 
Elyse, Richard and Doris in November 1993, who confirmed 
their 1993 investments and acknowledged that they had 
received and reviewed the materials provided in the 
package. After all the documents had been signed and 
returned to Boyd, he sent them to Calhoun. Calhoun then 
sent a complete set of the executed partnership documents 
to the investors with a one-line cover memo stating, 
"Enclosed for your records is an original set of partnership 
documents." This is the only direct communication from 
Drinker to the investors. 
 
In late 1993 and early 1994, Mercer LP fell below its net 
capital requirements. In an effort to keep the partnership 
afloat, Mercer LP failed to pay its brokers their full 
commissions. 
 
In May 1994, Mercer LP repurchased Elyse's original 
$50,000 investment. At about the same time, Mercer LP 
offered Warren the opportunity to invest $100,000 in a 
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Mercer LP subordinate debenture. Warren received a 
disclosure letter prepared with Strouse's assistance. The 
"May Disclosure Letter" contained the same omissions as 
the November Disclosure Package. The letter also failed to 
disclose the partnership's recent financial problems relating 
to the non-payment of commissions. Warren accepted the 
offer by executing the loan agreement in Massachusetts; 
the debenture was not, however, ever recorded in 
Massachusetts. 
 
In June 1994, Elyse, who by this time had become 
concerned over her investments with Mercer LP, consulted 
with attorney Barbara Podell in an attempt to recover her 
funds. Podell contacted the NASD, who sent her 
information on Coleman's compliance history. Elyse learned 
of Coleman's compliance history no later than the fall of 
1994. 
 
In December 1994, Schappell was killed by a bus. It was 
soon discovered that Schappell had severely and 
fraudulently mishandled some of his customers' accounts. 
Strouse was advised of the situation. At a meeting of the 
board of directors of Mercer, Inc., Strouse advised that the 
board not discuss the Schappell matter with anyone. 
Subsequently, Boyd sent the investors letters stating that 
Mercer LP faced problems because of Schappell's "untimely" 
death; the letters did not reveal the fraudulent conduct in 
which he engaged. 
 
In February 1995, Mercer LP failed. The investors lost 
their entire $400,000 investment ($200,000 from Elyse, 
$100,000 from Richard and Doris, and $100,000 from 
Warren). 
 
On August 23, 1995, the investors sued Mercer, Inc., 
Mercer LP, Boyd and Coleman. During discovery, the 
investors served subpoenas on Drinker and Tarantino. 
Among the documents produced in response to these 
subpoenas was the February Disclosure Package. This was 
the first time the investors had ever been aware of the 
package. On December 4, 1995, the investors filed their 
first amended complaint which asserted claims against 
Drinker, Tarantino, Jamgochian, and Stevens. 
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The investors' complaint against Drinker included claims 
for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, violation of RICO, 
and common law fraud, all arising from Drinker's 
involvement in the preparation of the November Disclosure 
Package and the May Disclosure Letter. The investors later 
attempted to amend further their amended complaint to 
assert claims against Drinker for failure to disclose material 
information under the Massachusetts Securities Act and 
the Pennsylvania Securities Act, and for fraud in violation 
of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act and the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law. The district court denied the investors' 
motion to amend as futile. 
 
The district court granted Drinker's motion for summary 
judgment on all counts. Subsequently, the investors settled 
with the remaining defendants. The investors appealed from 
the final order of the district court granting Drinker's 
motion for summary judgment on the securities act claim, 
the RICO claim, and the common law fraud claim, and also 
appealed from the district court's order denying the 
investor's motion to amend.4 
 
II. 
 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. S 78j(b), forbids "manipulative or deceptive acts in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Central 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
under section 10(b), makes it unlawful for "any person, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court had jurisdiction over the investors' federal 
securities 
claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. S 78aa and 28 U.S.C. S 1331. The court 
had jurisdiction over the investors' RICO claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 1964(c) and 28 U.S.C. S 1331. The court had supplemental jurisdiction 
over the investors' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, we have jurisdiction over the consolidated 
appeals from the final judgments of the district court entered on 
February 21, 1997 and March 17, 1997. 
 
                                11 
  
directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading." 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5(b). Although section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not explicitly provide a private 
right of action, the courts have inferred one. Scattergood v. 
Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 622 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 
Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 166, 171. 
 
To state a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a 
private plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) with 
scienter (2) made misleading statements or omissions (3) of 
material fact (4) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities (5) upon which the plaintiff relied in entering the 
transaction and (6) that the plaintiff suffered economic loss 
as a proximate result. Scattergood, 945 F.2d at 622; In re 
Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 
A. 
 
The district court dismissed Elyse's federal securities 
fraud claim against Drinker because it found that the claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations. An action under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "must be commenced within 
one year after the discovery of facts constituting the 
violation and within three years after such violation." 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 
U.S. 350, 364 (1991). 
 
The one-year limitation period begins to run when the 
victim is placed on so-called "inquiry notice" -- when the 
victim should have discovered the misrepresentation or 
omission through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Great 
Rivers Coop. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 
120 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997). Inquiry notice exists 
"when the victim is aware of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to investigate and consequently acquire 
actual knowledge of the defendant's misrepresentations." 
Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently 
explained the proper standard for determining when a 
person is on inquiry notice: 
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       [A] court must determine: (1) the facts of which the 
       victim was aware; (2) whether a reasonable person with 
       knowledge of those facts would have investigated the 
       situation further; and (3) upon investigation, whether 
       the reasonable person would have acquired actual 
       notice of the defendant's misrepresentations. If a 
       reasonable person aware of the facts known to the 
       victim would have investigated, that is, exercised 
       reasonable diligence, and consequently discovered the 
       misrepresentations, the victim had inquiry notice. 
 
Id. We agree with and adopt this definition of "inquiry 
notice." 
 
The following facts are not in dispute: (1) Elyse's claim 
against Drinker is largely premised on Drinker's failure to 
include information on Coleman's compliance history in the 
November Disclosure Package; (2) Elyse learned about 
Coleman's compliance history no later than the fall of 1994; 
(3) Elyse knew that Drinker represented Mercer LP in the 
fall of 1994; (4) Elyse did not file suit against Drinker until 
December 4, 1995 -- more than one year after she had 
notice of Coleman's history and Drinker's representation of 
Mercer LP. The district court concluded that Elyse was on 
inquiry notice of Drinker's alleged fraudulent conduct more 
than one year prior to the initiation of the lawsuit against 
Drinker, and it held that Elyse's federal securities claim 
was therefore barred as to Drinker. 
 
We agree with the district court. Elyse was placed on 
inquiry notice in the fall of 1994 when she learned of both 
Coleman's compliance history and Drinker's representation 
of Mercer LP. At that time, a reasonable person would have 
investigated and would have soon acquired actual 
knowledge of Drinker's role in the alleged 
misrepresentations. 
 
Elyse contends that she had no basis to believe that 
Drinker knew of Coleman's compliance history until after 
she filed suit against the other defendants and obtained the 
February Disclosure Package during discovery. We do not 
dispute that Elyse might not have had actual knowledge 
about Drinker's alleged role until receiving the February 
Disclosure Package. At issue, however, is whether Elyse 
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should have investigated in the fall of 1994. We conclude 
that a reasonable person in Elyse's position would have 
investigated at that time. As a result, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court insofar as it dismissed Elyse's 
federal securities claim against Drinker.5  
 
B. 
 
The district court also concluded that Drinker could not 
be liable to any of the investors under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 for the alleged omissions because Drinker never 
signed the documents it prepared regarding the 
investments and its name did not appear on any of the 
relevant Mercer LP documents. Since the investors were not 
aware of Drinker's involvement in the preparation of the 
disclosure documents, the district court reasoned, Drinker 
did not make any statements upon which the investors 
relied. 
 
The district court explained that a duty to disclose under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 arises from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. Klein v. Boyd, No. 95-5410, 1996 WL 
675554, at *27 (E.D. Pa. November 19, 1996) (citing Dirks 
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983)). Reasoning that the 
investors were not in a fiduciary relationship with Drinker, 
the district court concluded that Drinker did not have a 
duty to disclose information to the investors. Absent a duty 
to disclose, the court reasoned, there can be no liability for 
failure to disclose a material fact. 
 
In Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court held that 
since the text of section 10(b) does not itself reach those 
who aid and abet a section 10(b) violation, a private plaintiff 
may not maintain an aiding and abetting action under 
section 10(b). Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177, 191. 
According to the Court, section 10(b) "prohibits only the 
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the 
commission of a manipulative act. . . . The proscription 
does not include giving aid to a person who commits a 
manipulative or deceptive act." Id. at 177. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court found a genuine issue of material fact on the 
question of whether Richard and Doris were also placed on inquiry 
notice more than one year before filing suit against Drinker. 
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Although refusing to recognize a private cause of action 
for aiding and abetting liability, the Court acknowledged 
that secondary actors in the securities markets may still be 
liable under the securities acts: 
 
       The absence of S 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does 
       not mean that secondary actors in the securities 
       markets are always free from liability under the 
       securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a 
       lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a 
       manipulative device or makes a material misstatement 
       (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of 
       securities relies may be liable as a primary violator 
       under 10b-5, assuming all the requirements for 
       primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met. 
 
Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted). 
 
Several courts since Central Bank of Denver have 
attempted to demarcate a boundary between actions that 
would only amount to aiding and abetting and actions that 
rise to the level of a primary violation of section 10(b). See, 
e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th 
Cir. 1996); In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 
615 (9th Cir. 1994). Our inquiry requires us to investigate 
what it means for a secondary actor to make a materially 
misleading statement. In so doing, we hope to clarify 
circumstances under which a statement may fairly be said 
to have been "made" by a secondary actor. 
 
After Central Bank of Denver, it is reasonably clear that 
secondary actors such as lawyers can be held primarily 
liable for the misrepresentations and omissions contained 
in disclosure documents and other statements released to 
investors under the secondary actors' own names, 
assuming the other requirements for liability are met. For 
example, in Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 
(3d Cir. 1994), a law firm issued three opinion letters 
concerning the tax consequences of an investment in 
forward contracts through First Western. Although the 
letters stated that they were for the exclusive use of First 
Western, the law firm was aware that its opinion letters had 
reached potential investors. Id. at 483. The investors 
alleged that the opinion letters, upon which they relied in 
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deciding to invest, omitted material facts concerning the 
structure of the First Western transactions. 
 
The district court granted the law firm's motion for 
summary judgment on the investors' claim. The court 
reasoned that lawyers cannot be held liable for omissions in 
an opinion letter unless the investors can demonstrate that 
the lawyers had a duty to disclose the information that was 
omitted. Finding no evidence of a fiduciary or other 
relationship which would give rise to such a duty, the 
district court held that the investors could not proceed with 
their omissions claim. Id. at 490. 
 
We reversed. We noted: "We are dealing here with a 
situation in which [the law firm], by authoring its opinion 
letters, has elected to speak regarding the transactions at 
issue. Plaintiffs allege that this speech was misleading 
because [the law firm] failed to include in its opinion letters 
information that, if included, would have undermined the 
conclusions reached in those letters." Id. We concluded that 
once a law firm has chosen to speak, it may not omit facts 
material to its non-confidential opinions. Id.  at 490-91. 
 
We reasoned that the law firm's duty to not omit material 
facts did not arise from a fiduciary duty owed to the 
investors; rather, the duty arose when the law firm 
undertook the affirmative act of communicating with the 
investors: 
 
       [W]hen a professional undertakes the affirmative act of 
       communicating or disseminating information, there is 
       a general obligation or `duty' to speak truthfully . . . . 
       And encompassed within that general obligation is also 
       an obligation or `duty' to communicate any additional 
       or qualifying information, then known, the absence of 
       which would render misleading that which was 
       communicated. . . . [This duty] is simply one facet of 
       the general obligation to speak truthfully, arising out of 
       and because of an affirmative act by the defendant in 
       communicating. 
 
Id. at 491 (quotations omitted). Summary judgment was 
inappropriate even though the law firm never 
communicated directly with the investors, but merely 
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prepared opinion letters with knowledge that First Western 
was distributing those letters to potential investors. 
 
In Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991), 
attorney Howard Schwartz wrote an opinion letter which 
allegedly recited untrue "facts." The court of appeals held: 
"Although the lack of duty to investors means that 
Schwartz had no obligation to blow the whistle, and none 
to correct a letter he had not authorized to be circulated in 
the first place . . . , Schwartz cannot evade responsibility to 
the extent he permitted the promoters to release his letter." 
Id. at 848 (internal citations omitted). The court concluded 
that, if Schwartz authorized the inclusion of his letter with 
the offering documents, Schwartz could be liable as a 
principal, and not merely as an aider and abettor. Id. 
According to the court: "In order to recover from a 
professional for a report rendered to his client, the third 
party must establish that the professional was aware that 
the report would be used for a particular purpose, in 
furtherance of which a known person would rely, and the 
professional must show an understanding of this 
impending reliance." Id. at 846. 
 
If Drinker had prepared signed opinion letters, or other 
documents acknowledging Drinker's preparation and/or 
endorsement of the documents, for distribution to the 
investors that were materially misleading, we would have 
little difficulty acknowledging Drinker's liability for a 
primary violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, assuming 
the other requirements of liability were met. With one 
exception which we do not deem material to the outcome of 
this case, however, Drinker did not sign any documents for 
distribution to the investors.6 Indeed, the investors concede 
that they did not know about Drinker's involvement with 
Mercer LP until after they invested. We are thus faced with 
a question far more difficult than the one we answered in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Calhoun sent a complete set of executed partnership documents to the 
investors after Elyse, Richard and Doris confirmed their 1993 
investments and acknowledged that they had received and reviewed the 
materials provided in the November Disclosure Package. The investors do 
not contend that they relied on Calhoun's cover letter as Drinker's 
representation that the disclosure documents were accurate and 
complete. 
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Kline: Whether a lawyer who participated in the drafting of 
a client's fraudulent document may be held primarily liable 
to a third-party investor under the federal securities laws 
for the material misstatements or omissions contained in 
the document, when the lawyer did not sign or endorse the 
document and the investor is therefore unaware of the 
lawyer's role in the fraud. 
 
We conclude that lawyers and other secondary actors 
who significantly participate in the creation of their client's 
misrepresentations, to such a degree that they may fairly 
be deemed authors or co-authors of those 
misrepresentations, should be held accountable as primary 
violators under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even when the 
lawyers or other secondary actors are not identified to the 
investor, assuming the other requirements of primary 
liability are met. To obtain relief under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he 
or she relied on a misleading statement of the defendant 
and suffered an economic loss as a proximate result. 
Scattergood, 945 F.2d at 622. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
require the plaintiff to demonstrate reliance on the 
misleading statement; they do not require the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that he or she relied on the defendant's role in 
the preparation or dissemination of the statement. When an 
investor reasonably relies on a materially misleading 
statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security, the author of the statement should not be allowed 
to escape liability under the federal securities laws merely 
because the author is unknown to the investor. 
 
In In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 
1994), investors alleged that ZZZZ Best perpetrated a fraud 
in connection with the sale of ZZZZ Best securities. The 
plaintiffs also alleged that Ernst & Young was liable for its 
involvement in the creation, review and issuance of 
approximately thirteen publicly released statements related 
to the scheme. None of the statements attributed its 
existence to Ernst & Young or even hinted that thefirm 
might have been involved in the issuance of any of the 
statements. Id. at 965. Ernst & Young argued that those 
statements released to the public by ZZZZ Best and 
attributable only to ZZZZ Best or others, even if reviewed, 
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edited or approved by Ernst & Young, were not actionable 
against Ernst & Young as violations of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. 
 
The investors countered that if a "secondary actor" such 
as Ernst & Young actively participates in the creation of a 
materially misleading statement issued by a "primary actor" 
such as ZZZZ Best, then the so-called secondary actor has 
committed a primary violation of section 10(b). According to 
the plaintiffs, since Ernst & Young was actively involved in 
the writing and reviewing of the financial reports and press 
releases provided to the public by ZZZZ Best, and since 
Ernst & Young knowingly included information which was 
misleading in the documents, Ernst & Young committed a 
primary violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
 
The court agreed with the investors. Id. at 970. 
Acknowledging that the investors might not have been able 
to attribute the misstatements and omissions directly to 
Ernst & Young, the court reasoned that the investors still 
relied on the statements. According to the court,"anyone 
intricately involved in their creation and the resulting 
deception should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5." 
Id. 
 
Ernst & Young specifically challenged the investors' 
omissions-based claim on the ground that an alleged failure 
to act cannot give rise to a section 10(b) claim unless the 
investors establish a relationship with the defendant which 
gives rise to a duty to disclose. While agreeing with this 
general proposition, the court noted that "a general duty 
does exist to communicate any additional information, 
which in its absence would render misleading that which 
was already communicated." Id. at 971. If Ernst & Young 
was found to have sufficiently participated in the 
preparation of the misrepresentations and omissions such 
that they were attributable to the firm, the court reasoned, 
then Ernst & Young would have a duty to disclose or 
correct these previously released misrepresentations. Id. We 
find the reasoning of the court in ZZZZ Best to be 
persuasive. 
 
Drinker contends that it did not have a duty to "blow the 
whistle" on Mercer LP. It is reasonably clear that mere 
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silence, absent a duty to speak, is not actionable under 
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 235 (1980). Drinker also contends that it did not 
owe a fiduciary duty to the investors. We do not disagree. 
Our analysis does not end there, however. The investors 
contend, and we agree, that a duty to disclose may arise 
either from a fiduciary relationship or from affirmative 
representations that omit a material fact such that the 
representations made are misleading. 
 
We need not address the issue of whether a lawyer has 
an absolute duty to "blow the whistle" on his client. 
Instead, we are convinced that, as with the facts alleged 
here, when a lawyer elects to speak, the lawyer does have 
a duty to speak truthfully. See 17 C.F.R.S 240.10b-5 
(making it unlawful to "omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading"); see also Kline, 24 F.3d at 491 (when law firm 
elects to speak, it assumes the duty to communicate any 
additional or qualifying information, then known, the 
absence of which would render misleading that which was 
communicated). The fact that the lawyer is speaking 
"behind the scenes" does not absolve the lawyer of this 
duty. When a lawyer prepares a document with knowledge 
that the document will be distributed to investors, the 
lawyer has elected to speak to the investors, even though 
the document may not be facially attributed to the lawyer. 
While Drinker did not owe a fiduciary duty to the investors 
to "blow the whistle" on Mercer LP, Drinker did have a duty 
to correct material omissions contained in its statements. 
 
We do not suggest that a lawyer who merely provides 
"substantial assistance" to a client may be liable under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Such a holding would be 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of a private 
cause of action for aiding and abetting. See Central Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. at 168 (listing "substantial assistance 
given to primary violator" as one element of rejected aiding 
and abetting cause of action). Rather, we believe that a 
person may be liable for a primary violation of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 when the person's participation in the 
creation of a statement containing a misrepresentation or 
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omission of material fact is sufficiently significant that the 
statement can properly be attributed to the person as its 
author or co-author. At that point, the person has done 
more than provide mere substantial assistance; the person 
has become a primary violator of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, assuming that the other requirements of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are satisfied. This is true even if the 
investor is unable to attribute the statement to the person 
at the time of the transaction. 
 
We hold that when a person participates in the creation 
of a statement for distribution to investors that is 
misleading due to a material misstatement or omission, but 
the person is not identified to the investors, the person may 
still be liable as a primary violator of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 so long as (1) the person knows (or is reckless in not 
knowing) that the statement will be relied upon by 
investors, (2) the person is aware (or is reckless in not 
being aware) of the material misstatement or omission, (3) 
the person played such a substantial role in the creation of 
the statement that the person could fairly be said to be the 
"author" or "co-author" of the statement, and (4) the other 
requirements of primary liability are satisfied. 
 
Our holding is not without precedent. In In re Software 
Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994), the 
plaintiffs alleged that accountants violated section 10(b) by 
participating in the drafting of two letters sent by their 
client to the SEC. While the first letter specifically referred 
to the accountants, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the second letter, which was not 
attributed to the accountants, could also support section 
10(b) liability. According to the court, those who"played a 
significant role in drafting and editing" the second letter 
may be primarily liable under section 10(b). Id. at 628 n.3. 
The court determined that a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the accountants, "as members of the drafting 
group, . . . had access to all information that was available 
and deliberately chose to conceal the truth." Id. at 629; see 
also Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 
432 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (primary liability can be established by 
showing an accountant's "central involvement" in the 
preparation of material). 
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We believe that our holding is faithful to Central Bank of 
Denver. As noted above, we do not consider mere 
substantial assistance to be sufficient to establish primary 
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Rather, we 
conclude that when a person's participation in the creation 
of a statement is significant enough that the person may be 
considered the statement's "author" or "co-author," then 
the statement upon which the plaintiff relies is "made" by 
the person such that primary liability may attach under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 so long as the other 
requirements of primary liability are satisfied. 
 
In addition, nothing in the standard we adopt today is 
inconsistent with Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 
1215 (10th Cir. 1996). In Anixter, the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit stated that the "critical element 
separating primary from aiding and abetting violations is 
the existence of a representation, either by statement or 
omission, made by the defendant, that is relied upon by the 
plaintiff." Id. at 1225. We do not disagree with the Anixter 
standard; we agree that primarily liability under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will only attach to a secondary actor 
when that actor makes a false or misleading statement. Our 
holding today is meant only to clarify the circumstances 
under which a statement may fairly be said to have been 
"made" by a secondary actor.7 
 
Viewing the facts of this case in a manner most favorable 
to the investors, we conclude that plaintiffs have adduced 
sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact as to 
whether (1) Drinker was an author or co-author of the 
disclosure documents; (2) Drinker knew that those 
documents would be relied upon by the investors; and (3) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Anixter court notes that to the extent cases like ZZZZ Best and 
Software Toolworks "allow liability to attach without requiring a 
representation to be made by defendant" they do not comport with 
Central Bank of Denver. Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226 n.10. We do not, 
however, read these cases as allowing liability absent a statement made 
by the secondary actor. Rather, these cases articulate circumstances in 
which a secondary actor's participation in the creation of the fraudulent 
statement is so significant that the secondary actor can fairly be said to 
have made the statement. We therefore find that both ZZZZ Best and 
Software Toolworks faithfully adhere to Central Bank of Denver. 
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Drinker knew that material information was omitted from 
those documents. As a result, Drinker had a duty to ensure 
that the statements it made in the November Disclosure 
Package and May Disclosure Letter did not contain 
misstatements or omissions of material fact.8 The investors 
have proffered sufficient evidence at this stage to 
demonstrate that Drinker did not fulfill its duty. 
 
C. 
 
The district court also concluded that the investors failed 
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on the issue 
of scienter. Scienter is a necessary element of a cause of 
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In re Phillips 
Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1242 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Scienter is defined as "a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 1244 (quotations 
omitted); accord Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
194 n.12 (1976). Scienter may be found "only where there 
is intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or 
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the 
price of securities." Phillips Petroleum, 881 F.2d at 1244 
(quotations omitted). It is insufficient to show mere 
negligent conduct. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In order for an omission or misstatement to be actionable under 
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the omission or misstatement must be 
material; that is, it must alter the total mix of relevant information for 
a 
reasonable investor making an investment decision. In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1425-26 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (omitted fact is material 
if there is substantial likelihood that omitted fact would have assumed 
actual significance in deliberation of reasonable investor). Questions of 
materiality have traditionally been viewed as particularly appropriate for 
the trier of fact. Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426. Where 
alleged misrepresentations or omissions are obviously unimportant, 
however, courts may rule them immaterial as a matter of law. Id. 
 
The parties do not address the materiality question on appeal. It is 
reasonably clear to us that the omitted facts regarding Coleman's 
compliance history and restrictions and Mercer LP's restrictions were 
material. The omitted facts regarding Boyd and Schappell might also be 
material under the circumstances. It is appropriate in this case to leave 
the question of materiality to the trier of fact. 
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(3d Cir. 1985). Scienter must be proven by showing that 
"the defendant lacked a genuine belief that the information 
disclosed was accurate and complete in all material 
respects." Phillips Petroleum, 881 F.2d at 1244 (quotations 
omitted). 
 
A showing of recklessness on the part of the defendant is 
sufficient to establish scienter for a claim under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. Recklessness is defined as "an 
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . 
which presents a danger of misleading . . . that is either 
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor 
must be aware of it." Id. (quotation omitted). We have long 
recognized that circumstantial evidence may often be the 
principal, if not the only, means of proving scienter. Id. at 
1248; McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
 
We conclude that the investors have demonstrated the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
scienter. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
investors, a trier of fact could reasonably find the following: 
(1) Strouse knew that Mercer LP, through Coleman, 
improperly solicited the investors' original investments 
without making the necessary disclosures; (2) Strouse knew 
in May 1993 that the investors never received the February 
Disclosure Package and therefore never had an opportunity 
to rescind their original investments; (3) although Strouse 
encouraged Mercer LP to distribute the package in May 
1993, he never attempted to determine whether the 
package was subsequently delivered; (4) Strouse knew that 
Mercer LP and Coleman faced numerous regulatory 
difficulties throughout 1993 that presented severe 
difficulties for Mercer LP's financial future; (5) in September 
or October 1993, Strouse knew that Mercer LP, possibly 
through Coleman, had once again solicited substantial 
investments from the investors without distributing 
necessary disclosures; and (6) Strouse prepared the 
November Disclosure Package and May Disclosure Letter 
without including the material information that was 
contained in the undelivered February Disclosure Package 
and without including material information about his 
client's 1993 difficulties. 
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From the above facts, it would be reasonable for a trier of 
fact to infer that Strouse, who knew that Mercer LP and the 
investors' investments were in serious trouble, was 
concerned about his representation of Mercer LP and the 
behavior of his client. Although Strouse was not necessarily 
in a position to prevent Mercer LP from engaging in various 
misdeeds throughout its existence, a trier of fact could 
reasonably infer that Strouse did not do all that he should 
have done to ensure that his clients complied with the law 
and distributed the February Disclosure Package. A trier of 
fact might infer that Strouse was concerned that disclosure 
of the Coleman and Mercer LP information would lead to 
the investor's decision to rescind their investments, thus 
causing the downfall of Mercer LP and the exposure of 
possible oversights in Strouse's representation of Mercer 
LP. A trier of fact might reasonably infer that Strouse 
concealed this information in an effort to avoid rescission in 
the hope that Mercer LP would remain solvent and possible 
oversights would never be discovered. In sum, a trier of fact 
might reasonably infer that Drinker intentionally concealed 
material information from the November and May 
disclosure documents, and that it was motivated by a 
desire to avoid the financial and reputational repercussions 
that could follow from the investors' anticipated decision to 
rescind their investments. In other words, a trier of fact 
might reasonably conclude that Drinker acted with 
scienter. 
 
Or it might not. Drinker offers several explanations for its 
decision not to include the information about Coleman and 
Mercer LP in the November Disclosure Package and the 
May Disclosure Letter. We need not decide whether Drinker 
in fact acted with scienter when it decided to exclude 
certain information from the November and May disclosure 
documents. It is sufficient that we decide that a trier of fact 
could so conclude. 
 
D. 
 
On appeal, the investors contend that they submitted 
evidence that Drinker engaged in a conspiracy to violate 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Drinker counters that the 
Supreme Court's rationale in support of its decision 
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refusing to recognize a private cause of action for aiding 
and abetting in Central Bank of Denver also precludes 
recognition of a private cause of action for conspiracy.9 As 
the district court found, however, the investors did not 
plead a conspiracy claim in their amended complaint. A 
complaint must provide "fair notice of what the plaintiff's 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Krouse v. 
American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quotation omitted). Drinker was not placed on fair 
notice that the investors intended to pursue a conspiracy 
claim.10 Since the investors did not pursue a conspiracy 
claim in their amended complaint, we need not decide 
whether such a claim would be viable in the wake of 
Central Bank of Denver. 
 
III. 
 
The investors also pled a cause of action for common law 
fraud. In Pennsylvania, a cause of action for common law 
fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, contains the 
following elements: 
 
       (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the 
       transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Compare Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 200 n.12 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("The Court's rationale would sweep away the decisions 
recognizing that a defendant may be found liable in a private action for 
conspiring to violate S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."), In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Supreme Court's 
rationale in Central Bank of Denver precludes private right of action for 
conspiracy liability), and In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 
F. Supp. 974, 981-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same), with In re Towers Fin. 
Corp. Noteholders Litig., 936 F. Supp. 126, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(holding that Central Bank of Denver does not preclude private cause of 
action for conspiracy liability), and Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, 
Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 945 F. Supp. 84, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(same). 
 
10. A vague comment in paragraph 113 of the amended complaint's 
background section that the defendants "acted in concert together to aid 
and abet one another in order to obtain investments from Elyse, Richard 
& Doris, and Warren" is insufficient to place Drinker on fair notice that 
the investors intended to pursue a conspiracy claim. See Krouse, 126 
F.3d at 499-500 n.1. 
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       of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or 
       false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into 
       relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the 
       misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was 
       proximately caused by the reliance. 
 
Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994). The 
companion tort of fraudulent concealment or non- 
disclosure has the same elements as the tort of intentional 
misrepresentation except that in a case of intentional non- 
disclosure the party, with intent to deceive, intentionally 
conceals a material fact rather than making an affirmative 
misrepresentation. Id. at 889 n.12. 
 
To be liable for material non-disclosure in Pennsylvania, 
a party must first have a duty to speak. Duquesne Light Co. 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 611-12 (3d Cir. 
1995). That duty may arise when disclosure is necessary to 
prevent an ambiguous or partial statement from being 
misleading; it may also arise in certain circumstances when 
the undisclosed fact is basic to the transaction. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 551. For the reasons 
discussed above in connection with the federal securities 
claim, we conclude that a trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude that Drinker had a duty to speak when it 
prepared the disclosure documents.11 We therefore conclude 
that the district court improperly granted Drinker's motion 
for summary judgment on the investors' common law fraud 
claim.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We have noted an uncertainty regarding the extent to which 
Pennsylvania law includes the Restatement's discrete criteria for when a 
duty to speak arises. Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 612. Given the 
significance of the omitted facts concerning Coleman and Mercer LP, the 
nature of the transaction, and Drinker's role in the transaction, however, 
we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wouldfind a duty to 
speak in this case. 
 
12. Focusing exclusively on Pennsylvania law, the district court did not 
consider whether Warren's or Elyse's common law fraud claims should 
be decided under Massachusetts law. On remand, the district court 
should consider this issue in the first instance. See, e.g., Greenery 
Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Antaramian, 628 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1994) (discussing duty to disclose, citing Restatement (Second) 
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IV. 
 
The investors contend that Drinker is liable for 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting under RICO. Reasoning 
that Drinker did not owe the investors a duty to disclose 
material information and that the investors failed to adduce 
evidence of fraudulent intent, the district court granted 
Drinker's motion for summary judgment on these claims. 
Although, for reasons stated elsewhere in this opinion, we 
disagree with the district court's reasoning, we will 
nonetheless affirm the judgment of the district court 
because the investors' RICO claims fail as a matter of law. 
 
A. 
 
Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful "for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c). In Reves v. Ernst 
& Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), the Supreme Court limited 
the class of persons subject to liability under this section. 
The Court held that "one is not liable under[section 
1962(c)] unless one has participated in the operation or 
management of the enterprise itself." Id. at 183. In order to 
"participate" in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, the 
Court held, "one must have some part in directing those 
affairs." Id. at 179. 
 
According to the Court, "[a]n enterprise also might be 
`operated' or `managed' by others `associated with' the 
enterprise who exert control over it as, for example, by 
bribery." Id. at 184. Thus, "outsiders" may be liable under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of Torts S 551); see also Royal Bus. Group, Inc. v. Realist, Inc., 933 
F.2d 
1056, 1065 (1st Cir. 1991) (under Massachusetts law, one who "chooses 
to make a disclosure shoulders certain responsibilities of completeness 
and accuracy"). 
 
Under either Pennsylvania or Massachusetts law, Elyse's common law 
fraud claim is not time barred. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5524(7) 
(two-year limitations period in Pennsylvania); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 
S 2A (three-year limitations period in Massachusetts). 
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section 1962(c) if they participate in the operation or 
management of the enterprise itself. Id. at 185. 
 
The investors have proffered evidence suggesting that 
Drinker, with scienter, concealed material information from 
documents it knew would be given to the investors by its 
client. This is insufficient to support a rational inference, 
much less a finding, that Drinker participated in the 
"operation or management" of the Mercer RICO enterprise. 
Drinker may have assisted Mercer LP, and Drinker's legal 
services may have benefitted the Mercer enterprise. As a 
matter of law, however, there is no evidence suggesting that 
Drinker directed, operated or managed the Mercer 
enterprise's affairs. See, e.g., Hayden v. Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 955 F. Supp. 248, 254 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("the provision of professional services by 
outsiders, such as accountants, to a racketeering 
enterprise, is insufficient to satisfy the participation 
requirement of RICO, since participation requires some part 
in directing the affairs of the enterprise itself "); see also 
Reves, 507 U.S. at 185-86 (allegation that accountant's 
audit reports concealed cooperative's insolvency insufficient 
to establish participation in "operation and management" of 
RICO enterprise); University of Md. at Baltimore v. Peat, 
Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1539 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(policyholders failed to state RICO claim against insurer's 
independent auditor where claim was based solely on 
alleged preparation of false and misleading financial 
statements for insurer); In re American Honda Motor Co. 
Dealerships Relations Litig., 941 F. Supp. 528, 560 (D. Md. 
1996) ("Th[e] cases reveal an underlying distinction between 
acting in an advisory professional capacity (even if in a 
knowingly fraudulent way) and acting as a direct 
participant in [an enterprise's] affairs."); cf. Handeen v. 
Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1347-51 (8th Cir. 1997) (where 
debtor allegedly relinquished considerable control over 
Chapter 13 estate to lawyer, who took lead in making 
important decisions concerning operation of RICO 
enterprise, factfinder could conclude that lawyer 
participated in conduct of alleged RICO enterprise under 
section 1962(c)). Indeed, the investors do not contend on 
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appeal that Drinker committed a primary violation of 
section 1962(c).13 
 
B. 
 
The investors do contend that Drinker is liable as a 
conspirator under section 1962(d) for conspiracy to violate 
section 1962(c). Section 1962(d) provides that it is unlawful 
for any person to conspire to violate section 1962(a), (b), or 
(c). 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d). 
 
In United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
recognized that "a number of courts have held that even if 
a person may not be held directly liable for violating section 
1962(c), he or she still may be liable [under section 1962(d)] 
for conspiring to violate section 1962(c)." Id. at 580 
(collecting cases). We disagreed with this broad proposition. 
We held that while Reves still permits a RICO conspiracy 
claim to be brought against a defendant who conspired to 
operate or manage an enterprise, no cause of action will lie 
against a defendant for conspiring with someone who is 
operating or managing the enterprise. Id. at 581. We 
justified the distinction between "conspiring to operate" and 
"conspiring with someone who is operating" as follows: 
 
       [I]n the former situation, the defendant is conspiring to 
       do something for which, if the act was completed 
       successfully, he or she would be liable under section 
       1962(c). But in the latter scenario, the defendant is not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. On appeal, the investors contend that Mercer LP was the relevant 
RICO enterprise. Since Drinker did not operate, manage or direct Mercer 
LP as a matter of law, it cannot be liable under section 1962(c). In their 
amended complaint, the investors also alleged that the association 
between all the defendants, including Drinker, "constituted an 
`association-in-fact,' which also constituted an enterprise under RICO." 
Am. Compl. P 141. Since the investors did not pursue this argument on 
appeal, we need not decide whether the association between Drinker and 
the Mercer defendants could constitute a separate enterprise under 
RICO. In any event, we have serious doubts that this purported 
association-in-fact would be considered a RICO enterprise since it does 
not appear to be separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering 
activity in which it allegedly engaged. See United States v. Pelullo, 964 
F.2d 193, 211 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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       conspiring to do something for which he or she could 
       be held liable under the substantive clause of the 
       statute. Therefore, liability should not attach. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). In other words, it is not sufficient 
that Drinker conspired with Coleman in Coleman's alleged 
violation or attempted violation of section 1962(c). Rather, 
Drinker could only be liable under section 1962(d) for 
conspiring to do something for which, if the act was 
completed successfully, Drinker itself would be liable under 
section 1962(c). Since Drinker, who did not participate in 
the "operation or management" of the Mercer RICO 
enterprise, did not conspire to do something for which, if 
the act was completed successfully, it would be liable under 
section 1962(c), Drinker cannot be liable for conspiring to 
violate section 1962(c) as a matter of law. Accordingly, the 
investors' section 1962(d) conspiracy claim against Drinker 
cannot stand.14 
 
C. 
 
Finally, the investors contend that Drinker is liable for 
aiding and abetting a RICO violation. In Jaguar Cars, Inc. 
v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
observed that in prior cases "[w]e have held that a 
defendant may be liable under RICO if he aided or abetted 
the commission of at least two predicate acts." Id. at 270. 
Without further considering the existence of a private cause 
of action for aiding and abetting under RICO, we held that 
in order to find a defendant liable for aiding and abetting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In their briefs, the investors repeatedly note that in Antar, we 
recognized that other courts have held that liability attaches against a 
conspirator under section 1962(d) even if section 1962(c) liability is 
unavailable. The investors fail to disclose, however, that we specifically 
rejected this line of authority and concluded that no cause of action will 
lie against a defendant for conspiring with someone who is operating or 
managing an enterprise. Antar, 53 F.3d at 581. We call to the investors' 
attention Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 28.3(b) which provides that 
for each legal proposition supported by citations in the argument, 
"counsel shall cite to any opposing authority if such authority is binding 
on this Court, e.g., . . . published decisions of this Court." 3d Cir. R. 
28.3(b) (emphasis supplied). 
 
                                31 
  
under RICO, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the substantive 
act has been committed, and (2) that the defendant alleged 
to have aided and abetted the act knew of the commission 
of the act and acted with intent to facilitate it." Id. For 
reasons discussed elsewhere in this opinion, we believe that 
the investors have offered sufficient evidence to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact on both elements. 
 
Nonetheless, we will still affirm the judgment of the 
district court insofar as it dismissed the investors' RICO 
aiding and abetting claim against Drinker because we are 
convinced that a private cause of action for aiding and 
abetting a RICO violation cannot survive the Supreme 
Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver. There the 
Supreme Court held that a private plaintiff may not 
maintain an aiding and abetting suit under section 10(b). 
Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191. According to the 
Court, "the text of the statute controls" the scope of the 
conduct prohibited by section 10(b). Id. at 173. Reasoning 
that the text of section 10(b) does not reach those who aid 
and abet a section 10(b) violation, the Court concluded that 
"the statute itself resolves the case." Id. at 177-78.15 
 
Following the rationale of Central Bank of Denver, we are 
constrained to conclude that there is not a private cause of 
action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation. Just as the 
text of section 10(b) did not address aiding and abetting 
liability, the text of section 1962 does not contain any 
indication that Congress intended to impose private civil 
aiding and abetting liability under RICO. This silence 
"bodes ill" for the investors. Central Bank of Denver, 511 
U.S. at 175. 
 
Under the reasoning of Central Bank of Denver, our 
obligation is to "interpret and apply the law as Congress 
has written it, and not to imply private causes of action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although Congress has enacted a general aiding and abetting statute 
applicable to all federal criminal offenses, 18 U.S.C. S 2, it has not 
enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute. See Central Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. at 181-82. Thus, the enactment of a statute creating 
private civil liability for a primary violation of a statute does not give 
rise 
to a general presumption that such liability extends to aiders and 
abettors. Id. at 182. 
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merely to effectuate the purported purposes of the statute." 
In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1461, 
1475 (N.D. Ill. 1996). "The issue," the Supreme Court said, 
"is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and 
abettors is good policy but whether aiding and abetting is 
covered by the statute." Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
at 177. Thus, even though "[c]ivil RICO liability for aiding 
and abetting advances RICO's goal of permitting recovery 
from anyone who has committed the predicate offenses, 
regardless of how he committed them," Jaguar Cars, 46 
F.3d at 270 (quotation omitted), we conclude that it is for 
Congress, not the courts, to fix the scope of the RICO 
statute. The text of the RICO statute controls its scope; the 
text does not permit us to recognize a private cause of 
action of aiding and abetting a RICO violation. See Hayden, 
955 F. Supp. at 255-56 (holding that claim of aiding and 
abetting RICO violation must be dismissed "in accordance 
with the policies articulated in Central Bank of Denver"); 
Lake States Commodities, 936 F. Supp. at 1475-76 (same); 
Department of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 924 F. 
Supp. 449, 475-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same). 
 
We reach this result despite our discussion of aiding and 
abetting liability in Jaguar Cars, a case that was decided 
after Central Bank of Denver. In Jaguar Cars, we did not 
consider the impact of Central Bank of Denver  on earlier 
cases which had permitted a private cause of action for 
aiding and abetting under RICO. The only aiding and 
abetting issue before us in Jaguar Cars was whether the 
evidence at trial was sufficient to find one liable for aiding 
and abetting; the existence of the cause of action was 
presumed by the parties, and we did not raise the issue sua 
sponte. Notwithstanding the fact that a panel of this court 
is bound by, and lacks authority to overrule, a published 
decision of a prior panel, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1, we conclude 
that the panel's discussion of a private cause of action for 
aiding and abetting a RICO violation in Jaguar Cars is not 
conclusive here because the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Central Bank of Denver was not called to the panel's 
attention, and the opinion did not explicitly or implicitly 
decide the impact of Central Bank of Denver on the issues 
raised in that appeal. Cf. Jaguar Cars, 46 F.3d at 266 n.6. 
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V. 
 
We review the district court's denial of the investors' 
motion for leave to amend their complaint for abuse of 
discretion. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Leave to file an amended 
complaint is to be "freely given when justice so requires." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). When, however, the proposed 
amendments are futile (e.g., when they would not withstand 
a motion to dismiss), the district court should decline to 
allow the amendment. Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 419 (3d Cir. 
1997). In assessing futility, the district court should apply 
the same standard of legal sufficiency applied under Rule 
12(b)(6). Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1434. 
 
A. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court insofar 
as it denied the investors' motion for leave to amend their 
complaint to state a cause of action under section 9.2(a) of 
the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law ("UTP/CPL"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, S 201- 
9.2(a), which creates a private right of action for consumers 
injured in the purchase or lease of goods or services. The 
investors claim that they were injured in the purchase of 
goods. In Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. 
Partnership, 126 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997), however, we held 
that investment securities are not "goods" under the 
UTP/CPL. Id. at 187-88. But see id. at 191-92 (Mansmann, 
J., dissenting) (concluding that investment securities are 
"goods" when they are purchased primarily for personal, 
family or household purposes). 
 
Unlike the Pennsylvania UTP/CPL, the Massachusetts 
Consumer Protection Act applies to securities transactions. 
See Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 93A, S 2(a) ("Unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful."); id. S 1(b) (sale of securities is "trade" or 
"commerce"). Nonetheless, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court insofar as it denied the investors' motion 
for leave to amend their complaint to add a cause of action 
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for violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection law. 
Privity is not required to maintain a fraud-based action 
under chapter 93A "so long as the parties are engaged in 
more than a minor or insignificant business relationship." 
Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 
791, 795 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). Here, the investors did not 
have any contractual or business relationship with Drinker. 
Accordingly, the investors may not pursue a chapter 93A 
claim against Drinker. Cf. Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, 
Inc., 446 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Mass. 1983) (land surveyor, 
hired by seller of property, was not liable to buyer for 
failure to disclose high water table which increased cost of 
constructing septic tank). 
 
B. 
 
The investors also attempted to amend their complaint to 
add a cause of action under the Pennsylvania Securities 
Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, S 1-101 et seq. Section 401 of the 
Pennsylvania Act closely parallels section 10(b) of the 1934 
federal securities act.16 Unlike courts interpreting the 
federal securities act, however, courts interpreting the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act have not implied a private 
cause of action for violations of section 401. See, e.g., In re 
Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 
1388, 1439 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Rather, courts look to section 
501 of the act, which expressly provides, inter alia, that 
"[a]ny person who . . . offers or sells a security in violation 
of [section] 401 . . . shall be liable to the person purchasing 
the security from him." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70,S 1-501(a). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Section 401 provides: 
 
       It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale 
or 
       purchase of any security in this State, directly or indirectly: 
       (a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; 
       (b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to 
state 
       a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
       the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
       misleading; or 
       (c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which 
       operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, S 1-401. 
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The investors concede that Drinker was not a seller of 
securities and that they cannot, therefore, pursue a cause 
of action under the relevant portions of section 501. 
 
The investors contend, however, that a private cause of 
action exists against Drinker pursuant to section 503. 
Section 503(a) states in pertinent part: 
 
       Every affiliate of a person liable under section 501 or 
       502, . . . and every broker-dealer or agent who 
       materially aids in the act or transaction constituting 
       the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with 
       and to the same extent as such person . . . . 
 
Id. S 1-503(a). The plain language of section 503 dictates 
that an agent of a person who is liable under section 501 
to an investor who purchased a security is jointly and 
severally liable to the investor, when the agent materially 
aids in the acts or transactions constituting the violation. 
 
In Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 
605 (3d Cir. 1980), we stated in dicta that the "sole source 
of liability for any acts in violation of sections 401, 403 and 
404 of the Pennsylvania Securities Act . . . is found in 
section 501." Id. at 609 (emphasis omitted). Relying in part 
on Biggans, some district courts have held that an investor 
may not rely on section 503 to support a direct action 
against an agent; rather, the courts have held that section 
503 "only establishes a cause of action in favor of a party 
who has been held liable to a private party under section 
501." Penturelli v. Spector Cohen Gadon & Rosen, 640 F. 
Supp. 868, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1986); accord In re Phar-Mor, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 892 F. Supp. 676, 688 (W.D. Pa. 1995). The 
district court followed this line of cases and concluded that 
the investors could not pursue a Pennsylvania Securities 
Act claim against Drinker under section 503. 
 
In 1982, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania called into 
question our assumption in Biggans that the Pennsylvania 
Securities Act only provides causes of action against buyers 
and sellers. In Brennan v. Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, 
450 A.2d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), the court reasoned that 
the act "provides for joint and several liability among those 
primarily and/or secondarily liable under the act, and for 
the right of contribution between them." Id. at 747. The 
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court concluded that a lawyer "can be held liable to an 
investor as a violator of the Securities Act." Id. Although the 
underlying theory of liability asserted in Brennan was legal 
malpractice and not securities fraud, id., we believe that 
the court's reasoning is consistent with the plain language 
of section 503 and that an investor may bring a cause of 
action under the Pennsylvania Securities Act against an 
agent pursuant to section 503. 
 
In assuming in Biggans that section 501 provides the 
exclusive avenue for private recovery for a violation of 
sections 401, 403 and 404, we did not consider the impact 
of section 503 in our analysis. McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 
F.2d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 1989); accord Bull v. American Bank 
& Trust Co., 641 F. Supp. 62, 67 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1986) 
(Biggans did not discuss "the scope of civil liability 
stemming from the interrelationship of SS 501 and 503"). 
After considering the plain language of section 503, and 
after reviewing the intervening decision of a Pennsylvania 
intermediate appellate court, we conclude that our dicta in 
Biggans was incorrect and we predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would conclude that an investor may bring 
an action directly against an agent pursuant to section 503 
of the Pennsylvania Securities Act. 
 
The investors have proffered sufficient evidence to permit 
a factfinder to conclude that (1) Mercer LP is a"person 
liable under section 501," and (2) Drinker materially aided 
Mercer LP in the sale of securities to the investors. That 
does not completely answer the question, however, for we 
must also determine whether Drinker was an "agent" of 
Mercer LP. As defined by the Pennsylvania Securities Act, 
the term "agent" means "any individual, other than a 
broker-dealer, who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, S 1-102(c). 
 
The provisions of the Pennsylvania Securities Act quoted 
here are based substantially upon the Uniform Securities 
Act. The comment to section 401 of the Uniform Act notes 
that whether a particular individual who represents an 
issuer is an "agent" depends "upon much the same factors 
which create an agency relationship at common law." Unif. 
Sec. Act S 401, 7B U.L.A. 581 (1985). Under Pennsylvania 
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common law, the attorney-client relationship is generally 
one of agency. See Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424, 428 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1995), app. denied, 689 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1997). 
The statutory definition of "agent" in section 102, however, 
represents a deviation from the traditional common-law 
definition. We must, therefore, construe the meaning of the 
term "agent" as defined in the Pennsylvania Securities Act. 
 
Our research did not reveal any Pennsylvania cases 
resolving the question of whether and when a lawyer may 
be considered an "agent" for purposes of the Pennsylvania 
Securities Act. We look, therefore, to see how other courts 
have dealt with this issue in states that have adopted the 
Uniform Securities Act definition of "agent." 
 
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin discussed the liability 
of lawyers who, the plaintiff alleged, had materially aided in 
the creation of a false and misleading prospectus in a 
limited partnership offering. Rendler v. Markos, 453 N.W.2d 
202 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). The court interpreted a statutory 
definition of "agent" that parallels the one at issue here, 
and it concluded: 
 
       The definition of "agent" . . . does not include attorneys 
       who merely render legal advice or draft documents for 
       use in securities transactions. The definition covers 
       persons who assist directly in offering securities for 
       sale, soliciting offers to buy, or performing the sale, but 
       who do not fit the definition of broker-dealer. It is not 
       intended to cover professionals such as attorneys 
       engaging in their traditional advisory functions. 
 
Id. at 206; accord CFT Seaside Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. 
Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D.S.C. 1994) (predicting 
South Carolina securities law containing parallel"agent" 
definition). 
 
In Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 
356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993), the court construed a 
parallel definition of "agent" under the Maryland Securities 
Act. After conducting a thorough review of the 
interpretation of the term "agent" under similar laws in 
other states, the court concluded that the state securities 
laws "do not impose liability upon an attorney who merely 
provides legal services or prepares documents for his or her 
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client. To impose liability, the attorney must do something 
more than act as legal counsel." Id. at 368. The court held: 
 
       [A]n attorney could conceivably be considered an agent 
       if he or she "represents a broker-dealer or issuer in 
       effecting or attempting to effect the purchase or sale of 
       securities." In order to be considered an "agent," an 
       attorney must act in a manner that goes beyond legal 
       representation. The definition of "agent" . . . does not 
       include attorneys who merely provide legal services, 
       draft documents for use in the purchase or sale of 
       securities, or engage in their profession's traditional 
       advisory functions. To rise to the level of "effecting" the 
       purchase or sale of securities, the attorney must 
       actively assist in offering securities for sale, solicit 
       offers to buy, or actually perform the sale. 
 
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 
F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (lawyer who did not 
"personally and actively" employ opinion letter to solicit 
investors was not "agent," even where investors may have 
relied on opinion letter in making their investment decision; 
"[l]iability under the Indiana Securities Act requires 
something more than the mere drafting of an opinion 
letter"); accord Johnson v. Colip, 658 N.E.2d 575, 577-79 
(Ind. 1995) (reviewing cases and following reasoning in 
Ackerman); cf. Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 
458, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (purchaser could pursue West 
Virginia securities action against seller's lawyer as seller's 
"agent" because lawyer played direct role in sale, including 
making "face-to-face and direct telephonic representations" 
to purchaser). 
 
We are persuaded by this consistent interpretation of the 
term "agent" in this type of case. Under the Pennsylvania 
Securities Act, an individual is not an "agent" unless the 
individual "represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting 
or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 70, S 1-102(c). We hold that, although a 
lawyer or other professional could be considered an agent of 
their client under this definition, the person seeking to 
establish that the professional is an agent of the client 
must show more than a common-law agency relationship. 
As used in the Pennsylvania Securities Act, the term 
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"agent" does not include lawyers who merely render legal 
advice or draft documents for use in securities 
transactions. In order to be considered an "agent," a lawyer 
must act in a manner that goes beyond legal 
representation. The term covers individuals who actively 
assist in offering securities for sale, soliciting offers to buy, 
or performing the sale, but who do not fit the definition of 
broker-dealer. 
 
Drinker does not meet this definition as a matter of law.17 
Since Drinker is not Mercer LP's agent for purposes of the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act, the investors may not sue 
Drinker under section 503. We will, therefore, affirm the 
judgment of the district court insofar as it denied the 
investors' motion to amend their complaint to add a cause 
of action under the Pennsylvania Securities Act. 
 
We will also affirm the judgment of the district court 
insofar as it denied the investors' motion to amend their 
complaint to add a cause of action under the 
Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
110A, S 101 et seq. Like the Pennsylvania law, the 
Massachusetts law imposes liability on those who offer or 
sell securities. Id. S 410(a). In addition to the seller of the 
security, "every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids 
in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to 
the same extent as the seller." Id. S 410(b). Also like the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act, the Massachusetts Act defines 
"agent" as "any individual other than a broker-dealer who 
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or 
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." Id. 
S 401(b). As discussed above, courts in other jurisdictions 
have consistently refused to hold a lawyer liable as an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Our conclusion is supported by reference to the registration 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Securities Act: "It is unlawful for any 
person to transact business in this State as a broker-dealer or agent 
unless he is registered under this act." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, S 1-
301(a). 
Nowhere does the act require lawyers who merely advise persons 
involved in securities transactions to be registered as agents before 
providing that advice. The investors do not suggest that Drinker was 
required to register as an agent, and under the facts of this case, we 
conclude that it was not required to so register. Hence, Drinker cannot 
be considered an "agent" under the Pennsylvania Securities Act. 
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agent under parallel definitions of "agent." The investors do 
not point us to any Massachusetts case law that would 
suggest that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
would deviate from this line of cases, and our research has 
not uncovered any. For the reasons discussed above, 
Drinker is not an agent as a matter of law. 
 
VI. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the district court insofar 
as it granted Drinker's motion for summary judgment on 
the federal securities claims brought by Richard, Doris and 
Warren. We will reverse the judgment of the district court 
insofar as it granted Drinker's motion for summary 
judgment on the common law fraud claims brought by all 
of the investors. We will affirm the judgment of the district 
court in all other respects. We will remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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